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GROUP TESTIMONY: 
DEFENDING A REDUCTIONIST VIEW 
Domingos FARIA  
 
ABSTRACT: Our aim in this paper is to defend the reductionist (or deflationist) view on 
group testimony from the attacks of divergence arguments. We will begin by presenting 
how divergence arguments can challenge the reductionist view. However, we will argue 
that these arguments are not decisive to rule out the reductionist view; for, these 
arguments have false premises, assuming dubious epistemic principles that testimony 
cannot generate knowledge and understanding. The final part of this paper will be 
devoted to presenting the advantages of the reductionist approach to explaining the 
phenomenon of group testimony.  
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1. Group Testimony: Who Is the Source of Knowledge? 
We gain a lot of knowledge through the testimony of others; many of our beliefs 
are learned from the spoken or written word of others. The traditional problem in 
this field has to do with the epistemic status of these beliefs and whether or not a 
receiver needs positive reasons to accept the testimony of a sender. Following the 
tradition of David Hume, it is argued that receivers must possess positive reasons in 
order to be justified in accepting the testimony of senders. In contrast, following 
the tradition of Thomas Reid, it is stated that though the presence of positive 
reasons is not necessary to acquire testimonial justification or knowledge, the 
absence of negative reasons is necessary. Generally, the focus of analysis in these 
cases is the testimony of individuals. 
However, we can also acquire knowledge through the testimony of groups. 
For example, given the collaborative work done in science, we gain scientific 
knowledge through the testimony of research groups. Similarly it seems that we 
can acquire knowledge through the testimony of collective entities such as 
organizations, companies, clubs, churches, among others. In this paper, we want to 
deal with new problems on testimony related to collective epistemology: When we 
acquire knowledge from the testimony of a group, who is the source of this 
knowledge? Is this source reducible to an individual (or set of individuals) in the 
group? Or, instead, is this source not reducible to any element of the group, and 
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thus the group itself is that source of testimonial knowledge? In other words, can 
groups testify knowledge that their individual members lack? 
There are two main views that answer these problems: reductionism (or 
deflationism) and non-reductionism (or inflationism).1 On the one hand, the 
reductionist view holds that a group’s testimony that 𝑝 is reducible to the 
testimony of at least one individual in that group. In this sense, a group testifying 
that 𝑝 means that at least one individual member of the group would testify that 𝑝 
if the relevant opportunity arises.2 Here we want to focus on a minimal version of 
reductionism, which provides only a necessary condition, but not a sufficient 
condition, for group testimony. More precisely, this minimal view can be 
formalized as follows: 
Reductionism =df Necessarily, a group 𝑔 testifies that 𝑝 only if at least one 
individual 𝑖 is both a member of 𝑔 and testifies that 𝑝. 
□(𝑇𝑝𝑔 → ∃𝑖(𝑖 ∈ 𝑔 ∧ 𝑇𝑝𝑖)) 
This view needs some qualifications. Namely, the testimony of an individual 
member 𝑖 of 𝑔 must meet certain conditions, such as the following: (1) 𝑖 is 
authorized by 𝑔 to provide the testimony; (2) 𝑖 provides testimony as a member of 
𝑔. Thus, if 𝑖 is not licensed to testify on behalf of a group 𝑔, or if 𝑖 testifies as 
private individual or member of a distinct group 𝑔*, then her testimony is not 
considered group 𝑔 testimony.3 Lackey4 argues for a slightly different version of 
reductionism, according to which group testimony is reducible to the group’s 
spokesperson who does not have to be a member of the group. However, here we 
will assume that if there is a spokesperson who speaks on behalf of a given group, 
then that individual is somehow collaborating with the group and, therefore, 
belongs in a broad sense to that group.5 In short, according to reductionism, the 
                                                        
1 In this context of collective epistemology, the use of the terms “reductionism” and “non-
reductionism” cannot be confused with the reductionism of the Hume tradition and the non-
reductionism of the Reid tradition in the context of justifying individual testimony. 
2 See Jennifer Lackey, “A Deflationary Account of Group Testimony,” in Essays in Collective 
Epistemology, ed. Jennifer Lackey (Oxford University Press, 2014), 64–94, https://doi.org/ 
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199665792.003.0004 and Jesper Kallestrup, “Groups, Trust, and 
Testimony,” in Trust in Epistemology (Routledge, 2019), 136–58, https://doi.org/10.4324/ 
9781351264884-6. 
3 These qualifications are evidenced by Kallestrup (ibid.). 
4 “A Deflationary Account of Group Testimony.” 
5 We are assuming that groups may have different membership levels or status. In a strict sense a 
member of a group is one who is properly designated as such (for example by leaders or 
operational members, in an informal or formal context, and according to the rules of that group). 
In a broader sense, a member of a group is one who is contributing to the functioning of that 
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epistemic credentials of group testimony are reducible to the epistemic credentials 
of at least one authorized individual testimony who belongs in a narrow or broad 
sense to that group. 
On the other hand, the non-reductionist view is the negation of 
reductionism. In this view the group itself is the source of the testimonial 
knowledge. For, it holds the possibility that the testimony of a group is irreducible 
to the testimony of all or some of its individual members. So, a group testifying 
that 𝑝 cannot be understood in the sense that at least one individual member of the 
group would testify that 𝑝 if the relevant opportunity arises. More specifically, we 
can formalize non-reductionism as follows: 
Non-reductionism =df Possibly, a group 𝑔 testifies that 𝑝 even when no individual 
member of 𝑔 testifies that 𝑝. 
◊(𝑇𝑝𝑔 ∧ ¬∃𝑖(𝑖 ∈ 𝑔 ∧ 𝑇𝑝𝑖)) 
Which of these perspectives is the most plausible? In this paper, we want to 
defend the reductionist view against divergence arguments. We will begin in 
section 2 by presenting how divergence arguments can challenge the reductionist 
view. However, in section 3, we will argue that these arguments are not decisive to 
rule out the reductionist view. Section 4 will be devoted to presenting advantages 
of the reductionist approach to explaining the phenomenon of group testimony.  
2. Divergence Arguments Against Reductionism 
So-called divergence arguments are the main motivation for non-reductionism. 
These arguments aim to show that reductionism is false because it is possible for a 
group to testify that 𝑝 while none of its individual members testifies 𝑝 (or is able to 
testify 𝑝). Thus, concerning testimonial knowledge, there is an epistemic 
divergence between groups and their individual members. In support of this 
divergence there are two strong counterexamples against the reductionist view. 
The first counterexample presents a case in which a group clearly testifies 
                                                                                                                      
group; in other words, a member is someone who plays some kind of functional role for the 
group. Following the proposal of David Strohmaier, “Group Membership and Parthood,” Journal 
of Social Ontology 4, 2 (2018): 132, https://doi.org/10.1515/jso-2018-0016, “a part of a group is a 
member of this group if, and only if, it is an agent and it is appropriately designated to contribute 
to the group’s functioning. (…) The members are not designated as members but as contributing 
to the group’s functioning.” A spokesperson seems to satisfy these conditions to be a member of a 
group. Namely, the spokesperson is a member of a group because he is an agent and, moreover, 
has been appropriately designated as contributing to its functioning (by playing the functional 
role of spokesperson). 
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knowledge which its individual members lack. This case is inspired by J. Adam 
Carter:6 
REPORT CASE: A small committee of art experts has been called in to determine 
the veracity of a very rare pottery piece. This committee uses the best methods of 
science to distinguish genuine and fake antiquities. By following strictly 
professional and scientific norms they come to a conclusion: the dating of this 
pottery piece is approximately 14,000 BC – we call this proposition 𝑞 to 
abbreviate. Suppose this committee writes a public report with that conclusion 𝑞. 
However, each member of this committee is a young earth creationist, and 
therefore privately each believes that the earth and the very rare pottery piece are 
less than 6,000 years old. 
This REPORT CASE is a case where not a single member of the group in 
question believes that 𝑞 and so, each of its individual members fails to know that 𝑞, 
yet recipients or readers of the public report can nonetheless acquire knowledge 
that 𝑞 on the basis of the group’s testimony that 𝑞. But if each one fails to believe 
and to know the proposition 𝑞, then no individual member can be the source of 
testimonial knowledge that 𝑞. This is because if a sender doesn’t know that 𝑞, then 
there is no way that a recipient can come to know that 𝑞 through believing the 
sender’s testimony.7 Instead, the group itself is the source of testimonial 
knowledge, given that the group itself knows that 𝑞.8 If this case is plausible, 
reductionism is false. 
                                                        
6 “Group Knowledge and Epistemic Defeat,” Ergo, an Open Access Journal of Philosophy 2, 
20190926 (2015), https://doi.org/10.3998/ergo.12405314.0002.028. 
7 This premise is defended by Angus Ross, “Why Do We Believe What We Are Told?” Ratio, 1 
(1986): 69–88, Michael Dummett, “Testimony and Memory,” in Knowing from Words (Springer 
Netherlands, 1994), 251–72, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-2018-2_12, Robert Audi, “The 
Place of Testimony in the Fabric of Knowledge and Justification,” American Philosophical 
Quarterly 34, 4 (1997): 405–22, https://doi.org/10.2307/20009910, Tyler Burge, “Content 
Preservation,” Philosophical Issues 6 (1995): 271, https://doi.org/10.2307/1523046; “Interlocution, 
Perception, and Memory,” Philosophical Studies 86, 1 (1997): 21–47, https://doi.org/10.1023/a: 
1004261628340, Steven L. Reynolds, “Testimony, Knowledge, and Epistemic Goals,” 
Philosophical Studies 110, 2 (2002): 139–61, https://doi.org/10.1023/a:1020254327114. The main 
idea of this premise is that the testimony only transmits, but does not generate new knowledge. 
In other words, testimony only disseminates knowledge, does not discover or generate it. 
8 Non-reductionist or inflationary accounts of group knowledge support the possibility that 
knowledge attributions apply to groups while they do not apply to their members. See, for 
example, Margaret Gilbert, “Collective Epistemology,” Episteme 1, 2 (2004): 95–107, 
https://doi.org/10.3366/epi.2004.1.2.95, Raimo Tuomela, “Group Knowledge Analyzed,” Episteme 
1, 2 (2004): 109–27, https://doi.org/10.3366/epi.2004.1.2.109, Kay Mathiesen, “Can Groups Be 
Epistemic Agents?” in Collective Epistemology, eds. Hans Bernhard Schmid, Daniel Sirtes, and 
Marcel Weber (Ontos, 2011), 23–44, Alexander Bird, “When Is There a Group That Knows?” in 
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Another important counterexample is based on distributed cognition in 
which there is a division of cognitive labor within a group. In such a case the task 
of producing knowledge is divided into subtasks. Each subtask is assigned, 
depending on the area of expertise, to different individual members. However, no 
member of the group is able to grasp each other’s tasks. Thus it seems that the 
production of knowledge, and its consequent testimony, is not reducible to 
individual members, but is something that depends on the group itself. In order to 
clarify this point, we can imagine a case inspired by Alexander Bird:9 
TALK CASE: Dr. X is a physicist and Dr. Y is a mathematician. Both are 
collaborating on a project to demonstrate the truth of the conjecture 𝑞, but each 
one works alone and without communicating. Suppose they agreed in advance 
with an assistant, who only knows how to apply modus ponens, to give a talk 
showing that 𝑞 just in case the assistant receives independently from Dr. X the 
proof that 𝑝 is true and from Dr. Y the proof that 𝑝 → 𝑞. Based on empirical 
experiments Dr. X shows that 𝑝; while based on pure mathematics Dr. Y shows 
that 𝑝 → 𝑞. The assistant applies modus ponens and gives the talk. 
In this case the research team seems to know and to testify that 𝑞, and such 
knowledge is acquired and understood by an audience of scientists to whom the 
assistant is giving the talk. However, none of the research team members 
individually knows and is able to testify that 𝑞. Neither the assistant himself, who 
is giving the talk, is the source of the testimonial knowledge that 𝑞; given that he 
does not have the ability to understand the demonstration that 𝑝 and the proof that 
𝑝 → 𝑞, as well as he is unable to grasp the meaning of 𝑞. He is simply reading the 
result, not understanding the body of information or domain he is talking about. In 
this regard, Kallestrup10 holds that: 
The testifier is the group itself. The point here is not so much that the assistant 
lacks knowledge of 𝑞, but that he even lacks the required expertise to grasp such a 
complex proposition. Because nobody can properly assert a proposition they do 
not understand, the assistant cannot be regarded as testifying that 𝑞. Nor can 
either Drs. X and Y be said to testify 𝑞. Nothing about the way the case is 
described suggests their linguistic behavior amounts to an assertion that 𝑞. Dr. X 
asserts that 𝑝 but not 𝑝 → 𝑞, whereas Dr. Y asserts 𝑝 → 𝑞 but not 𝑝, and so neither 
                                                                                                                      
Essays in Collective Epistemology, ed. Jennifer Lackey (Oxford University Press, 2014), 42–63, 
https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199665792.003.0003, and Deborah Tollefsen, Groups as 
Agents (Polity, 2015).  
9 “Social Knowing: The Social Sense of ’Scientific Knowledge’,” Philosophical Perspectives 24, 1 
(2010): 23–56, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1520-8583.2010.00184.x; “When Is There a Group That 
Knows?” 57–58. 
10 “Groups, Trust, and Testimony,” 140. 
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asserts 𝑞 on the basis of modus ponens. 
Are these counterexamples decisive in defending non-reductionism and 
rejecting reductionism? In the next section we will argue that these are not good 
counterexamples. 
3. Defeating Divergence Arguments 
In the previous section, we saw two main ways to attack the reductionist view. 
Now we want to argue that none of them is plausible. 
3.1 Problems With the First Argument 
Analyzing the first case, REPORT CASE, we can highlight that the central 
argument can be reconstructed as follows: No single member of the group 𝑔 knows 
that 𝑞. If no single member of 𝑔 knows that 𝑞, then a recipient 𝑅 cannot come to 
know that 𝑞 on the basis of the testimony that 𝑞 provided by a single member of 𝑔. 
Thus, 𝑅 cannot come to know that 𝑞 on the basis of the testimony that 𝑞 provided 
by a single member of 𝑔. However, REPORT CASE shows that 𝑅 can come to 
know that 𝑞 on the basis of the testimony that 𝑞 provided by 𝑔 itself, given that 𝑔 
itself can know that 𝑞. Therefore, if this is so, then the source of testimonial 
knowledge is 𝑔 itself, not being reducible to its individual members. Is this a good 
argument? Note that the argument works only if the following premise is true: 
(K) If a sender 𝑆 doesn’t know that 𝑝, then a recipient 𝑅 cannot come to know 
that 𝑝 on the basis of the testimony that 𝑝 provided by 𝑆. 
Premise (K) underlies the idea that the testimony is merely transmissive and 
cannot itself generate new knowledge. In other words, the testimony can only 
transmit epistemic properties from one subject S1 to another S2; so, if S1 has no 
knowledge, then S2 cannot acquire knowledge through S1’s testimony. Simply put, 
it would be like relying on a friend to pay our bill, but that friend is broke as we 
are; if he can’t pay the bill, we can’t either. An analogy between testimony and 
memory is often presented as a reason for this premise (K). For instance, 
Dummett11 writes that: 
If remembering something is to count as retaining a knowledge of it, it must have 
been known when originally witnessed or experienced; if it was derived from a 
misperception or misapprehension, the memory cannot of course rank as 
knowledge. The same naturally applies to taking something to be so, having been 
told it: the original purveyor of the information – the first link in the chain of 
transmission – must himself have known it, and therefore have been in a position 
                                                        
11 “Testimony and Memory,” 264. 
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to know it, or it cannot be knowledge for any of those who derived it ultimately 
from him. 
The main point has to do with the fact that memory only preserves 
knowledge from a moment to another, so testimony also only transmits knowledge 
from a sender to a receiver. In both cases no knowledge is generated, only 
preserved or transmitted. But is that plausible? A direct objection to (K) is 
presented by Peter J. Graham12 through the following compelling counterexample: 
TEACHER CASE: A devout creationist teaches at a public school where she must 
teach a section on evolutionary theory. She does not believe a word of it, but is a 
dedicated and responsible teacher. She develops a near expert understanding 
based on deep reading of books and articles on evolutionary science. She even 
develops a deep understanding of fossils that parallels highly skilled scientifically 
trained expertise. On a fieldtrip she discovers a fossil that proves that ancient 
humans [from which we evolved] once lived in this area (itself a surprising 
discovery no one knew before) [– for brevity let’s call this proposition 𝑝]. Though 
she does not believe it, when she tells this to her students, they believe her. 
Because of her commitment to teaching, her exposure to evolutionary science, 
and her mastery of fossils, she would not say what she did unless it were true. Her 
assertion is a reliable indicator. Relying on their teacher, the schoolchildren 
would not easily be mistaken. 
In this case the sender, the creationist teacher, doesn’t know that 𝑝, because 
she doesn’t believe 𝑝 (only accepts 𝑝 for practical teaching and research 
purposes).13 However, the receivers, the students, know that 𝑝, given that they 
have a safe and justified true belief, un-Gettierized, that 𝑝. This case shows that a 
sender 𝑆 doesn’t know that 𝑝, but a recipient 𝑅 can come to know that 𝑝 on the 
basis of the testimony that 𝑝 provided by 𝑆. Moreover, it is shown that testimony 
not only transmits knowledge but can also generate it. This is because the first link 
in the chain of transmission, the teacher, doesn’t know that 𝑝; yet her testimony 
was able to generate knowledge in the students – since these students know 
                                                        
12 “Testimonial Knowledge: A Unified Account,” Philosophical Issues 26, 1 (2016): 176, 
https://doi.org/10.1111/phis.12082. 
13 Here we are claiming that belief and acceptance are different states. On the one hand, belief is 
an involuntary dispositional state, aims at truth, follows evidence, is ideally coherent, and comes 
in degrees. On the other hand, acceptance is voluntary, aims at pragmatic success, follows 
interests and desires, and allows for contradiction. See Jonathan Cohen, “Belief and Acceptance,” 
Mind XCVIII, 391 (1989): 367–89, https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/xcviii.391.367, Andrei Buckareff, 
“Acceptance and Deciding to Believe,” Journal of Philosophical Research 29 (2004): 173–90, 
https://doi.org/10.5840/jpr_2004_17, and Hamid Vahid, “Alston on Belief and Acceptance in 
Religious Faith,” The Heythrop Journal 50, 1 (January 2009): 23–30, https://doi.org/10.1111/ 
j.1468-2265.2009.00430.x. 
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through the teacher’s testimony something new that no one has ever known 
before.14 Thus, premise (K) is false.  
Since (K) is false, REPORT CASE is not plausible to deny the view that 
group testimony is a reducible source of knowledge. For, just as students, in 
TEACHER CASE, can come to know a theory from the testimony of a teacher who 
does not know that theory (because she does not believe it), it is also possible that 
recipients of the public report, in REPORT CASE, can come to know that 𝑞 on the 
basis of the testimony that 𝑞 provided by a single member of the committee who 
does not know that 𝑞. In other words, since a sender 𝑆 need not know that 𝑞 in 
order for a recipient to acquire knowledge that 𝑞 through 𝑆’s testimony, there is no 
reason to claim that lack of knowledge on the part of singular members of the 
committee, in REPORT CASE, precludes recipients from knowing that 𝑞 through 
their testimony. On this basis we can state that REPORT CASE does not show that 
reductionism is false.15 
3.2 Problems With the Second Argument 
The second counterexample, TALK CASE, has advantages over REPORT CASE, 
since it is not based on the controversial premise (K). With regard to TALK CASE, 
Kallestrup16 argues that group testimony is not reducible to the testimony of any of 
its members, not even to the assistant member who is giving the talk. This is 
because if someone 𝑥 testifies that 𝑞, then 𝑥 properly asserts that 𝑞. And if 𝑥 
                                                        
14 This case has advantages over similar ones. One of the most popular cases is the creationist 
teacher presented by Jennifer Lackey, “Testimonial Knowledge and Transmission,” The 
Philosophical Quarterly 49, 197 (1999): 471–90, https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9213.00154; 
Learning from Words: Testimony as a Source of Knowledge (Oxford University Press, 2008). 
This teacher professionally teaches the theory of evolution, but does not believe in this theory 
and thus does not know it. But her students are in a position to gain knowledge about the theory 
of evolution. The problem is that Lackey case does not undermine (K), given that the first links 
in the chain of transmission, that goes back to Darwin, know that the theory of evolution is the 
case. This last teacher just skips a link in the chain of testimonial knowledge and so knowledge is 
not generated by the chain. However, in the case modified by Graham (“Testimonial 
Knowledge”) we do not have this problem. For a discussion of such cases see Peter J. Graham, 
“Can Testimony Generate Knowledge?” Philosophica 78 (2006): 105–27, J. Adam Carter and 
Philip J. Nickel, “On Testimony and Transmission,” Episteme 11, 2 (2014): 145–55, 
https://doi.org/10.1017/epi.2014.4, Stephen Wright, Knowledge Transmission (Routledge, 2018), 
https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315111384. 
15 Lackey, “A Deflationary Account of Group Testimony.” used a similar argumentation to rule 
out counterexamples with an identical structure to REPORT CASE. However, she did not deal 
with counterexamples with an identical structure to TALK CASE. 
16 “Groups, Trust, and Testimony.” 
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properly asserts that 𝑞, then 𝑥 understands 𝑞. However, the assistant does not 
understand nor is able to grasp 𝑞; in the words of Kallestrup, “he lacks the required 
expertise to grasp such a complex proposition.”17 Therefore, the assistant does not 
testify that 𝑞. Neither Dr. X nor Dr. Y can testify that 𝑞, given that they are not 
even aware of this conclusion 𝑞. Thus, the testifier is the group itself. Is this a good 
argument? There are several problems with this argument. 
3.2.1 Testimony Can Generate Understanding 
First of all, underlying this argument is the following premise: 
(U) If a sender 𝑆 doesn’t understand 𝜙, then a recipient 𝑅 cannot acquire 
understanding of 𝜙 on the basis of the spoken or written word about 𝜙 
provided by 𝑆. 
Understanding, along with knowledge, is an important type of cognitive 
achievement. Ideally we not only want to know things, but also to understand 
them. There are several types of understanding, but here we will focus mainly on 
the more common – the so-called objectual understanding – which takes the form 
of “𝑆 understands 𝜙” where 𝜙 is a certain domain, subject matter, or a body of 
information.18 For example, “𝑆 understands the theory of evolution.” It is typically 
accepted that a necessary condition for a subject 𝑆 to understand something 𝜙 is to 
be able to offer an explanation of 𝜙.19 In this regard, Jonathan L. Kvanvig20 holds 
that “understanding requires the grasping of explanatory and other coherence-
making relationships in a large and comprehensive body of information.” In the 
same line of reasoning, Wayne D. Riggs21 argues that understanding a domain 
“requires a deep appreciation, grasp, or awareness of how its parts fit together, 
                                                        
17 Ibid. 
18 In addition to objectual understanding, one can also distinguish interrogative understanding, 
which take the form “𝑆 understand why 𝜙”, and propositional understanding, which take the 
form “𝑆 understand that 𝑝.” It can be argued that there is nothing distinctive about this latter 
kind of understanding, because propositional understanding can be reduced to propositional 
knowledge. See Emma C. Gordon, “Is There Propositional Understanding?” Logos & Episteme 3, 
2 (2012): 181–92, https://doi.org/10.5840/logos-episteme20123234. 
19 Since understanding somehow implies reflexively accessible bases in support of the object of 
understanding, Pritchard (Epistemology (Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2016), 128, https://doi.org/ 
10.1007/978-1-137-52692-2.) considers that understanding, unlike knowledge, “is of its nature an 
epistemically internalist notion.” 
20The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding (Cambridge University Press, 2003), 
192, https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511498909. 
21 “Understanding ‘Virtue’ and the Virtue of Understanding,” in Intellectual Virtue (Oxford 
University Press, 2003), 217, https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199252732.003.0010. 
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what role each one plays in the context of the whole, and of the role it plays in the 
larger scheme of things.” Understanding also has a social dimension: in epistemic 
communities there are some members – such as epistemic authorities, experts, 
teachers – who help other members to better understand something through 
testimony. Thus, it seems that testimony plays a relevant role in spreading 
understanding within epistemic communities. 
Given this, one might find it intuitive to accept premise (U). For, if the 
sender does not understand a particular topic or domain, how can the recipient 
understand that topic from the sender’s word? In other words, it does not seem 
possible to improve understanding of a specific domain in a recipient if the sender 
has no understanding of that domain. It is based on (U) that it can be said that, in 
relation to TALK CASE, if the assistant doesn’t understand the domain of things to 
which 𝑞 belongs, then a recipient, an audience, cannot acquire understanding of 
that domain or body of information of which 𝑞 is part through the assistant’s 
spoken or written word. However, given that the audience has acquired 
knowledge and understanding of the information set containing 𝑞, the assistant 
cannot be regarded as testifying 𝑞, but instead “the testifier is the group itself” as 
Kallestrup22 supports. Is this plausible? We want to argue that the intuition that 
underlies premise (U) is mistaken. In order to show this, to rule out premise (U), 
we have developed the following counterexample: 
SCHOOL ASSISTANT CASE: Suppose the creationist teacher has already taught 
her students the theory of evolution. But because of an illness, she cannot teach 
the lesson in which she would explain a body of information that contains the 
topic that a new fossil proves that ancient humans from which we evolved once 
lived in a certain area – let’s call this information 𝜓 for short. Since this teacher 
did not come to the class, because of her illness, a school assistant intentionally 
decided to give this lesson about 𝜓 to these students. However, such a school 
assistant does not know nor understand anything about science, evolutionary 
theory or fossils. Nevertheless, she fetched the pedagogical notes about 𝜓 from 
the teacher’s desk and began to read them rigorously so that these students could 
learn about 𝜓. Due to prior knowledge of the theory of evolution and fossils, such 
students were able to understand 𝜓. 
In this case, the sender, the school assistant, does not understand 𝜓, but the 
recipients, the students, can acquire understanding of 𝜓 from the written and 
spoken word provided by the assistant. Due to students’ background knowledge, it 
is reasonable to accept that they are able to explain 𝜓 and make connections 
between 𝜓 and the theory of evolution through the school assistant’s testimony. If 
                                                        
22 “Groups, Trust, and Testimony.” 
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so, it is shown that testimony can be a generative source of understanding. Just as 
this situation can occur in the individual testimony, can also occur in the group 
testimony. Thus, as it is possible for students to gain understanding of a 
phenomenon 𝜓 from the spoken and written word provided by the school assistant 
who does not understand 𝜓, it is also possible, with regard to TALK CASE, for an 
audience of scientists to gain understanding of a domain of things to which 𝑞 
belongs from the spoken and written word provided by the research assistant who 
does not understand that domain of things. Given that, TALK CASE is not decisive 
in rejecting reductionism, because the assistant doesn’t need to understand a 
domain (which contains 𝑞) in order to testify and generate understanding about 
that domain in his audience.23 
3.2.2 Proper Assertion and Understanding 
Advancing another type of objection, it may be pointed out that Kallestrup24 seems 
to accept in his argument that if the assistant does not understand 𝑞, then he 
cannot properly assert 𝑞. And if the act of testifying involves proper assertion, the 
assistant cannot testify that 𝑞.25 However, one can reply by stating that, although 
the assistant does not understand 𝑞, he understands another proposition; namely, 
that the content 𝑞, whatever it may be, is the result of evidence provided by Dr. X 
and Dr. Y with the application of modus ponens (we use 𝑟 to abbreviate this 
proposition). Thus the assistant can proper assert 𝑟 and, based on this, an audience 
of scientists is able to understand and know both 𝑟 and 𝑞 through this assistant’s 
testimony. In other words, the assistant believes 𝑟 and this belief enables him to 
proper assert 𝑞, on the basis of which the audience may then understand 𝑞.26 Yet 
this argument assumes that there can be no proper assertion without 
understanding. But is this true? 
To make this clear, let’s first look at a brief characterization of assertion. The 
speech act of assertion denotes the familiar phenomenon by which a subject states, 
reports, contends, or claims that something is the case. But what distinguishes 
assertion from other speech acts (such as speculations or guesses)? It is typically 
                                                        
23 For a different argument against premise (U), see Federica Isabella Malfatti, “Can Testimony 
Generate Understanding?” Social Epistemology 33, 6 (2019): 477–90, https://doi.org/ 
10.1080/02691728.2019.1628319. 
24 “Groups, Trust, and Testimony.” 
25 This requirement that a proper assertion is necessary for testimony seems very strong. See 
Sanford C. Goldberg, “Assertion, Testimony, and the Epistemic Significance of Speech,” Logos & 
Episteme 1, 1 (2010): 59–65, https://doi.org/10.5840/logos-episteme20101121. 
26 We are grateful to Amanda Bryant for this idea. 
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accepted, according to Sanford C. Goldberg,27 that “assertion is the unique speech 
act that is governed by a particular rule: the so called norm of assertion.” Thus, the 
speech act of assertion can be individuated by reference to this rule or norm. Such 
norm has the following structure: 
One should assert that 𝑝 only if 𝜙. 
where we replace “𝜙” with the condition that captures the content of this norm. 
There has been a lot of disagreement over what is the most appropriate way to 
replace “𝜙”. The main candidates for 𝜙 are the following: one knows that 𝑝,28 it is 
true that 𝑝,29 one is epistemically certain that 𝑝,30 it is reasonable for one to believe 
that 𝑝.31 But the argument put forward by Kallestrup32 against reductionism 
assumes a different norm of assertion: 
Understanding norm of assertion (UNA): One should assert that 𝑝 only if one 
understands 𝑝. 
It is based on this norm that Kallestrup claims that the assistant in TALK 
CASE is not properly asserting that 𝑞 and, thus, is not testifying that 𝑞, since 
“nobody can properly assert a proposition they do not understand.”33 But is this 
UNA rule plausible? We want to argue that UNA is false. On the one hand, if UNA 
is read in the sense of objectual understanding, as we are using in the previous 
section (which is the most typical sense of understanding),34 then a speaker 
𝑆 should assert that 𝑝 only if 𝑆 understands a domain or body of information of 
which 𝑝 is part. But this is a very strong requirement for assertion. A speaker need 
not understand a domain of things to which 𝑝 belongs in order to make a proper 
                                                        
27Assertion: On the Philosophical Significance of Assertoric Speech (Oxford University Press, 
2015), 3, https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198732488.001.0001. 
28 Timothy Williamson, Knowledge and Its Limits (Oxford University Press, 2000), 
https://doi.org/10.1093/019925656x.001.0001. 
29 Matthew Weiner, “Must We Know What We Say?” Philosophical Review 114, 2 (2005): 227–
51, https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-114-2-227. 
30 Jason Stanley, “Knowledge and Certainty,” Philosophical Issues 18, 1 (2008): 35–57, 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1533-6077.2008.00136.x. 
31 Lackey, Learning from Words. 
32 “Groups, Trust, and Testimony.” 
33 Ibid., 140. 
34 Here we will not address the reading of UNA with propositional understanding, because it is 
commonly argued – for example, by Gordon, “Is There Propositional Understanding?” – that 
propositional understanding is reduced to propositional knowledge. So with this reading UNA 
collapses into the knowledge norm of assertion (KNA). Cases such as TEACHER CASE can be 
presented as counterexamples to KNA. See Lackey, Learning from Words. 
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assertion that 𝑝. For instance, if our car breaks down, we can properly assert to our 
auto mechanic: “the car is not working properly.” And we can make this assertion 
in absence of understanding about the domain related to the functioning of cars 
and their mechanical components. It is not necessary to have any understanding 
about automobiles and their mechanical operation to make this assertion without 
being subject to criticism. If UNA were true, only experts in a given domain could 
make appropriate assertions about some proposition of that domain.35 However, 
such requirement would absurdly preclude laypeople from making assertions. Our 
SCHOOL ASSISTANT CASE can also be a counterexample for UNA. For, in this 
case we have a school assistant who makes an assertion about fossils without any 
understanding about this domain. Moreover, her assertion does not seem improper, 
given that she is aware that the teacher’s notes she is using are appropriate, reliably 
conveying information for students. 
On the other hand, if UNA is read in the sense of interrogative 
understanding, then a speaker 𝑆 should assert that 𝑝 only if 𝑆 understands why 𝑝. 
And for 𝑆 to understand why 𝑝, 𝑆 must give an explanation or reason 𝑞 why 𝑝 (in 
other words, interrogative understanding is equivalent to understanding that 𝑝 
because 𝑞). According to Alison Hills,36 “understanding why 𝑝, though, requires 
more than the correct belief that 𝑝 because 𝑞. It requires a grasp of the reason why 
𝑝, or more precisely, a grasp of the relationship between 𝑝 and 𝑞.” This means that, 
for example, 𝑆 is able to provide the correct explanation or reason 𝑞 for the 
information that 𝑝, to draw the conclusion that 𝑝 from the explanation that 𝑞, 
explaining the relation between 𝑝 and 𝑞 in his own words, among other aspects.37 
But requiring such an interrogative understanding to make proper assertions is a 
very strong demand. For example, we can adequately assert to our auto mechanic 
that the car we are using is not accelerating properly (compared to its usual 
operation), even when we are unable to find out a non-circular explanation or 
reason for it. And if our auto mechanic tells us that the car is not accelerating 
properly because the car has bad spark plugs, we can thus gain knowledge of such 
an explanation, yet we may be in a situation where we do not understand such an 
explanation. This is because, unlike the auto mechanic, we don’t have any 
background beliefs about spark plugs nor are we able to grasp how the spark plugs 
are associated with the operation of car acceleration. However, there seems to be 
                                                        
35 For the idea that what distinguishes experts from laypeople is at least their understanding of a 
domain, see Michel Croce, “On What It Takes to Be an Expert,” The Philosophical Quarterly 69, 
274 (2018): 1–21, https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqy044. 
36 “Understanding Why,” Noûs 50, 4 (2015): 663, https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12092. 
37 For a complete characterization see Hills, “Understanding Why.” 
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nothing wrong with making that initial assertion about car acceleration problems. 
Once again, to require understanding to make proper assertions would be to 
improperly intellectualize the speech act of making assertions, since only experts 
would be entitled to make assertions. Even those who are in favor of accepting the 
condition of interrogative understanding in some cases consider that “the proposal 
that understanding is the norm of assertion is false,” such as J. Adam Carter and 
Emma C. Gordon38 in claiming that:39 
There are indeed many proper assertions for which any kind of understanding is 
not a necessary condition – for example, ‘the bird is yellow’ (an assertion of 
perceptual knowledge) does not require being able to fill out any further claim 
including the word ‘because’ before that particular assertion counts as 
permissible. 
What is the main epistemic aim of assertion? As we argued above, this main 
purpose does not seem to be related to the speaker’s understanding; instead it 
seems more plausible to accept that the relevant aim of assertion is generating (or 
at least it has the disposition to generate) some epistemic status in the hearer or 
recipient. This is for two main reasons: First, because the social function of 
language is to convey or communicate information, often through assertion speech 
acts. Second, because we are cognitively limited beings (that is, we cannot afford to 
know many things firsthand or in isolation), we need to rely on other people’s 
words, especially on proper assertions, to gain knowledge. Based on similar 
reasons, Charlie Pelling40 argues for the following rule of assertion:41 
Audience-oriented norm of assertion (ANA): One should assert that 𝑝 only if it is 
fit to give a hearer knowledge that 𝑝.42 
                                                        
38 “Norms of Assertion: The Quantity and Quality of Epistemic Support,” Philosophia 39, 4 
(2011): 631, https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-011-9317-6. 
39 Mona Simion, “The Explanation Proffering Norm of Moral Assertion,” Ethical Theory and 
Moral Practice 21, 3 (2018): 486, https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-018-9922-6 also rules out UNA. 
40 “Assertion and the Provision of Knowledge,” The Philosophical Quarterly 63, 251 (2013): 294, 
https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9213.12013. 
41 Manuel García-Carpintero, “Assertion and the Semantics of Force-Markers,” in The 
Semantics/Pragmatics Distinction, ed. Claudia Bianchi (CSLI Publications, 2004), 156 developed 
an assertion rule very similar to this one. 
42 It is necessary to clarify how this rule allows to overcome those counterexamples of proper 
assertions without hearers, such as a private assertion (for example, written in the secret diary). 
According to Pelling (“Assertion and the Provision of Knowledge,” 300.), “we should think of 
assertions which are fit to give knowledge as those that, even if they do not in fact give 
knowledge, at least have the right kind of evidential bases – the kind which they would need to 
have in order to give knowledge.” 
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In a similar way, Christoph Kelp43 holds that assertion has the epistemic 
function of generating knowledge in hearers, defending the following rule of 
assertion: 
Functionalist norm of assertion (FNA): One should assert that 𝑝 only if it has the 
disposition to generate knowledge that 𝑝 in hearers. 
If these ANA and FNA assertion rules are plausible, we can say that in TALK 
CASE the assistant made a proper assertion. This is because what the assistant 
utters about 𝑞 to his audience in that context has the disposition to generate 
knowledge and understanding in his audience about 𝑞, even if the assistant himself 
has no knowledge or understanding of that domain. After all, what the assistant 
utters comes from reliable processes (applying modus ponens from information 
received from Dr. X and Dr. Y) and this utterance about 𝑞 generates knowledge 
and understanding in his audience of scientists. He does not violate any plausible 
and relevant assertion rule that we are considering.44 But, if this is so, then there is 
no reason to hold that the assistant is not really testifying that 𝑞. Thus, TALK 
CASE does not show that reductionism in relation to group testimony is false. 
3.2.3 Assertion and Grasping 
Perhaps Kallestrup45 can reply that the biggest problem is not with the violation of 
an assertion norm, but with the act of asserting itself. In other words, the assistant’s 
speech act cannot even be considered an assertion because he does not grasp the 
proposition under consideration; in Kallestrup’s own words, the assistant “even 
lacks the required expertise to grasp such a complex proposition.”46 So it seems that 
Kallestrup47 is committed to the idea that grasping is a necessary condition for 
assertion and, since the assistant is not able to grasp the proposition 𝑞, he cannot 
believe and assert such a proposition or testify it. 
However, Kallestrup reasons are not plausible; for, as we will argue below, 
on the one hand, grasping, understood in a phenomenal sense, is not a necessary 
condition for believing and asserting; and, on the other hand, there are other 
                                                        
43 “Assertion: A Function First Account,” Noûs 52, 2 (2016): 16, https://doi.org/ 10.1111/nous. 
12153. 
44 It could be argued that what the assistant utters does not satisfy the knowledge norm of 
assertion (KNA). However, with TEACHER CASE it can be indorsed that KNA is false. See 
Lackey, Learning from Words, 111–14 and Pelling, “Assertion and the Provision of Knowledge,” 
305–7. 
45 “Groups, Trust, and Testimony.” 
46 Ibid., 140. 
47 “Groups, Trust, and Testimony.” 
Domingos Faria 
298 
theories of grasping in which we can hold that the assistant grasps such a 
proposition 𝑞. So it is worth questioning: what grasping a proposition is? Given 
that Kallestrup does not give us any account of “grasping,” it is important to survey 
what are the main theories of grasping. 
Before this analyses, in order to show that Kallestrup is wrong, we will start 
by presenting simple and intuitive examples in which a subject can genuinely 
assert that 𝑝, for example by believing and reporting that 𝑝, without grasping (in a 
phenomenal sense) that 𝑝. If these examples are plausible, we show that there can 
be assertion without grasping (in such a phenomenal sense). Let’s look at two cases: 
COLOR-BLIND CASE: Suppose that Mary is a complete color-blind or achromat; 
so, she is unable to grasp the proposition that <ripe tomatoes are red>. However, 
she learned this proposition at school, by trusting her teacher testimony, and 
believes that it is so. For this reason, she is able to assert that <ripe tomatoes are 
red>, when reporting this to her son, without really grasping this proposition. 
PRE-TEEN CASE: Suppose that Joseph, a pre-teen, has not yet acquired the 
required expertise to grasp a complex scientific proposition, such as <the Sun is 
about 1,300,000 times the volume of the Earth>. But, he learned this proposition 
from his father, an astrophysicist, and by trusting his father he believes that 
proposition is true (although he doesn’t grasp it). When he is talking to his 
friends, he is able to assert that <the Sun is about 1,300,000 times the volume of 
the Earth>, by reporting it, without grasping this proposition. 
These examples illustrate that there is a state of mind – grasping (related 
with phenomenal experiences) – that goes beyond belief, knowledge and assertion, 
in such a way that one can assert that 𝑝 (as well as one can believe and know that 
𝑝) without grasping that 𝑝. Thus, if such cases illustrate that there can be assertion 
without grasping, the same can happen with the assistant in TALK CASE. In fact, 
the assistant knows that proposition 𝑞 is not meaningless; moreover, he knows that 
𝑞 belongs to the scientific domain, and he also knows that 𝑞 was produced by a 
reliable process through the application of an inference of modus ponens from the 
information received by the reliable testimonies of Dr. X and Dr. Y. If it is so, the 
assistant can assert that 𝑞, when reporting such proposition to his audience, even if 
he is unable to grasp such a complex proposition (similarly to what happens in 
COLOR-BLIND CASE and in PRE-TEEN CASE). 
In such cases, it seems that the subjects under consideration genuinely make 
an assertion. Following Goldberg,48 we can say that they are uttering a declarative 
sentence, in a sincere way (and not pretending or guessing), aiming communicate 
knowledge (which they received by trusting on reliable testimonies). In addition, 
                                                        
48Assertion, 6–9. 
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the assertions of such subjects can be challenged. For example, a recipient can ask 
on what basis they make these claims – and they can respond that they make these 
claims on the basis of reliable testimonies (in conjunction with an inference rule, at 
least in TALK CASE).49 This can be considered as evidence that these subjects can 
have for their claims. 
But although they assert a proposition, there is a sense in which we can say 
that they do not grasp that proposition. Why not? According to David Bourget,50 
the best theory of grasping is the phenomenal theory, in which “grasping a 
proposition is a matter of having a phenomenal experience that has the proposition 
as its content,” namely: 
(TFT) The Phenomenal Theory: To grasp 𝑝 is to have a phenomenal experience 
with 𝑝 as content.  
In such theory, experiences have intentional contents in the weak sense of 
presenting things. For example, when I look at at one of my books, I seem to 
undergo an experience that presents me with a rectangular shape with many sheets 
of paper, etc. (TFT)’s central point can be summed up in the idea that grasping is a 
matter of experience, in such a way that if we cannot experience the content of a 
proposition, then we don’t grasp it. That’s why Mary, in COLOR-BLIND CASE, 
doesn’t grasp the proposition that <ripe tomatoes are red>; precisely because she 
lacks the ability to experience the color red (in perception or imagination). But 
suppose it is possible to perform a surgical operation that allows Mary to gain the 
ability to see colors for the first time. In that case, Mary would be able to grasp the 
proposition under consideration. 
Something similar can be said about PRE-TEEN CASE. In this case, Joseph 
doesn’t grasp the proposition that <the Sun is about 1,300,000 times the volume of 
the Earth> because he is unable to experience this content or something similar; 
for example, because he has no visual model available to help him in such task. The 
same is true with TALK CASE; the assistant doesn’t grasp the proposition that 𝑞, 
given that he lacks the required expertise to build a visual model (or do not have a 
model available) that would allow him to experience such content. Despite this, 
even though they do not have this type of grasping, as we argued above, they can 
assert the proposition in question. However, suppose that Joseph’s father, in PRE-
TEEN CASE, builds a model to assist his son in grasping the new proposition 
                                                        
49 But suppose the recipient is not satisfied with that answer. According to Goldberg (ibid., 75), 
in this situation these subjects are epistemically entitled to pass the epistemic burden to those 
people from whom they received those beliefs. 
50 “The Role of Consciousness in Grasping and Understanding,” Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research 95, 2 (2015): 19, https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.12208. 
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learned. Such a model draws, for example, an analogy that allows him to visualize 
that the relationship between the volume of the sun and the earth is like the 
relationship between the volume of a basketball and the volume of an apple seed.51 
This model helps Joseph to grasp this content by providing him with a visual 
experience. A similar model could help the assistant, in TALK CASE, to grasp the 
complex proposition 𝑞. But the assertion can occur regardless of this type of 
grasping. 
There are other theories of grasping in which it is not even necessary to 
offer a visual model or some kind of experience for the subject to grasp the 
proposition in question. The most typical and influential theory of grasping is the 
inferential theory. On this theory, following Bourget, “grasping a proposition is a 
matter of having a thought that represents the proposition and is suitably 
connected to other mental states through inference-like dispositions.”52 So, 
grasping a proposition 𝑝 has to do with being able to reason properly about the 
implications between 𝑝 and other propositions. Such a theory is supported by 
Kvanvig,53 Martine Nida-Rümelin,54 Stephen R Grimm,55 Daniel A. Wilkenfeld56 
and can be presented like this: 
(TIT) The Inferential Theory: A thought 𝑡 with content 𝑝 is a grasping of 𝑝 to the 
extent that 𝑡 is appropriately inferentially connected to other mental states of the 
subject.57 
But this theory allows us to conclude that, in the cases mentioned above, as 
well as in the TALK CASE, the subjects really grasp the propositions under 
consideration, precisely because they are able to make inferences based on such 
propositions. Starting with COLOR-BLIND CASE, even if Mary is unable to have 
phenomenal experiences of red (call it 𝑅), she can learn (from reliable testimonies) 
and know that <red things cause 𝑅 experiences>; and based on that she can infer 
that <ripe tomatoes cause 𝑅 experiences>, <at typical vertical traffic lights, the 
lamp at the top, when switched on, causes 𝑅 experiences>, <when a fire truck 
                                                        
51 This example is inspired by Bourget (ibid., 3–4). 
52 Ibid., 11. 
53The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding. 
54 “Grasping Phenomenal Properties,” in Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge 
(Oxford University Press, 2007), 307–38, https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/ 
9780195171655.003.0013. 
55 “Understanding,” in The Routledge Companion to Epistemology (Routledge, 2011), 110–20. 
56 “Understanding as Representation Manipulability,” Synthese 190, 6 (2013): 997–1016, 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-011-0055-x. 
57 See Bourget, “The Role of Consciousness in Grasping and Understanding,” 14. 
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appears, it causes 𝑅 experiences>, <things marked with the RED symbol (in the 
ColorAdd system) cause 𝑅 experiences>, and so on. 
Something similar can be said about PRE-TEEN CASE. Joseph can establish 
numerous inferences from the proposition <the Sun is about 1,300,000 times the 
volume of the Earth>, such as <the sun is larger than our school>, <the sun cannot 
be a soccer ball>, and so on. This same strategy is available to the assistant in TALK 
CASE. In such a case from the complex proposition 𝑞, and given his background 
knowledge, the assistant can infer that <𝑞 belongs to the scientific domain>, <𝑞 is 
not about philosophy or literature>, <𝑞 must be presented to an audience of 
scientists and not to an audience of children>, and so on. So, if the assistant is able 
to make inferences based on the proposition under consideration, then according 
to (TIT) theory he really grasp the proposition 𝑞. 
It is worth considering a last theory of grasping that is based on the work of 
Timothy Williamson.58,59 On Williamson’s account, to grasp a word or proposition 
is to be a member of a community that uses that word or proposition. In addition, 
one counts as a member of a community insofar as one participates in relevant 
causal interactions with other members of that community. In this regard, 
Williamson60 holds that such members “use a word as a word of a public language, 
allowing its reference in their mouths to be fixed by its use over the whole 
community.” In turn, a subject does not grasp a word or proposition when, 
following Williamson, there is a “lack of causal interaction with the social practice 
of using that word” or proposition.61 Simply put, this theory holds that: 
(TET) The Externalist Theory: To grasp 𝑝 is to be a member of a community that 
uses 𝑝. 
Based on this theory we can claim that the subjects in the cases above grasp 
the propositions under consideration, given that they have a “sufficiently fluent 
engagement in the practice” in which such propositions are used. For example, 
Mary is a member of a community through which she has causal interactions (for 
example, through testimony) to use the proposition that <ripe tomatoes are red>. 
This is also true of Joseph regarding the proposition that <the Sun is about 
1,300,000 times the volume of the Earth>. And the same solution can be applied to 
the assistant in TALK CASE. In such a case it can be argued that the assistant has 
                                                        
58 “‘Conceptual Truth’,” Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 80, 1 (2006): 1–41, 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8349.2006.00136.x; The Philosophy of Philosophy (Blackwell 
Publishing Ltd, 2007), https://doi.org/10.1002/9780470696675. 
59 We are grateful to Bruno Jacinto for this suggestion. 
60 “‘Conceptual Truth’,” 36. 
61 Ibid., 38. 
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causal interaction with the social practice of using the proposition 𝑞 (after all, he 
acquired such proposition 𝑞 for being part of a research community and for giving 
a talk to an audience of scientists who are going to use this proposition). Thus, 
contrary to Kallestrup,62 we can conclude that there is a sense in which the 
assistant grasps the proposition 𝑞. But even in an interpretation in which he does 
not grasp 𝑞, as seen in the phenomenal theory, the assistant can continue to assert 
𝑞. 
3.2.4 A Final Objection 
As a last objection, it can be argued that the assistant in TALK CASE, because he 
does not understand complex propositions about physics such as 𝑝 and complex 
mathematical propositions such as 𝑝 → 𝑞, is not able to apply a modus ponens 
based on those propositions.63 For it does not seem that one can properly apply 
modus ponens from what is not understood. For example, suppose we received 
from two different people two identical sentences containing indexicals; if we do 
not know the context of illocution of such sentences, it does not seem that we can 
say that they express the same proposition, nor can we properly use such sentences 
to make inferences. Thus, if the assistant does not understand the content of 
complex propositions, how can he know that the proposition provided by the 
physicist is the same proposition that corresponds to the antecedent of a 
conditional provided by the mathematician? The point is that the assistant could 
properly apply modus ponens rule only if it were just a syntactic application. But it 
does not seem that applying the modus ponens rule is just a syntactic application. 
Instead, in order to properly apply modus ponens one must know the semantics, 
the meaning, of what is being considered. 
A proponent of the non-reductionist view may be able to resist this latter 
objection by slightly modifying TALK CASE. Suppose, instead of the assistant 
applying modus ponens, he has a different and much simpler task. Dr. X and Dr. Y 
gave the assistant a three-part pre-written text: the first part only has the 
conclusion 𝑝 and a blank space to put the proof provided by Dr. X; the second part 
only has the conclusion 𝑝 → 𝑞 and a blank space to put the proof provided by 
Dr. Y; in the last part appears the application of modus ponens with the final 
conclusion 𝑞. Suppose further that Dr. X and Dr. Y have no other communication 
with each other and are able to reach desired individual conclusions without the 
other knowing this result. Thus, the assistant only needs to perform the following 
                                                        
62 “Groups, Trust, and Testimony.” 
63 We are grateful to Ricardo Santos for this idea. 
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task: if the assistant independently receives Dr. X proof and Dr. Y proof, he will 
mechanically fill in the blanks of this pre-written text with those proofs and read 
the entire text to his audience.64 
However, this modification of TALK CASE is still worse than the case 
originally presented in section 2. For in this modified case the assistant has no 
cognitive achievement. At least in the original case the assistant had a relevant 
cognitive task, making an important contribution: trying to apply modus ponens 
(which seems to involve not only syntactic but also semantic tasks). Now his role is 
reduced to a mere automatic input and output system, working only at syntactic 
level. There is no salient difference between this assistant or a computer in 
performing the task in question. If this is so, then it is not clear that we are facing a 
group testimony case, because testimony involves intentions to convey information 
and it is doubtful that an automatic system, like a computer, has such intentions. 
Furthermore, if what is transmitted by the system results from a simple automatic 
merging of individually written and non-collaborative information from Dr. X and 
Dr. Y, then this does not seem to be a group testimony case, but rather a case of a 
single output containing several instances of individual testimony. But if the group 
is effectively collaborative and moreover if the assistant is not like a computer and 
really intends to convey information on group behalf to a particular audience then, 
as we argued in the previous sections, the testimony of such a group can be 
reducible to the assistant’s testimony. 
4. Advantages of Reductionism 
In the previous sections we argued that premises (K) and (U) are false. A more 
plausible and reasonable epistemic principle to the phenomenon of testimony 
seems to be the following: 
(R) If a sender 𝑆 is not reliable in transmitting information that 𝑝, then a recipient 
𝑅 is not in position to know (or to understand) that 𝑝 on the basis of the 
testimony that 𝑝 provided by 𝑆. 
This principle (R) allows testimony to function as a generative epistemic 
source. This is because, as we saw in TEACHER CASE, a sender knowing that 𝑝 is 
not necessary for a recipient to acquire testimonial knowledge that 𝑝; rather, what 
is necessary, among other conditions, is reliability in the transmission of 
information by the sender. Without reliable transmission, there is no testimonial 
knowledge acquisition. A similar point can be made regarding understanding.  
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Looking at REPORT CASE again, there is no problem that no single member 
of committee knows that 𝑞, because a sender’s knowledge that 𝑞 is not necessary 
for a recipient to acquire knowledge that 𝑞 on the basis of sender’s testimony. The 
important thing, according to (R), is the reliability in the transmission of 
information. In this regard, a singular member 𝑆 of committee, being a competent 
scientist, can individually and reliably transmit the information that 𝑞. Thus, the 
source of testimonial knowledge is not the committee itself, but it is somehow 
reducible to the reliability of 𝑆. For, whether recipients acquire knowledge that 𝑞 
on the basis of 𝑆’s testimony depends on whether 𝑆 is reliable in transmitting 
information that 𝑞. An analogous description can be made for TALK CASE. 
This is a reductive view on group testimony, since the epistemic status of 
testimony of a group 𝑔 on a given proposition 𝑝 reduces to the reliability in the 
transmission of information that 𝑝 by a singular member of 𝑔. Following this 
reductionist view, group testimony can be treated just like an instance of 
individual testimony, there being no special epistemology to deal with the 
phenomenon of group testimony. Thus, in order to explain and evaluate group 
testimony, we only need to use the available resources we have to evaluate 
individual testimony. From this perspective, the phenomenon of group testimony 
does not involve any mystery and can be explained in a parsimonious way, because 
it does not require new theoretical resources. However, following a non-
reductionist view, there are several difficult explanatory tasks: in particular, it 
would be necessary to develop a successful framework to explain how groups can 
act and have intentions in a way that does not depend solely on the individual acts 
and intentions of its members. The reductionist view is simpler and is not 
subordinate to this explanatory framework.65 
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